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Abstract
Why did IR pluralism end with so many incommensurable camps? (How) can IR be 
demarcated as a discipline where these camps can find common ground for dialogue 
without glossing over theoretical pluralism? To answer the first question, the paper 
argues that Morgenthau’s critique of IR as social science can explain the proliferation 
of camps in IR pluralism that are incommensurable and cannot engage in dialogue. By 
transcending the dilemma of politics as highlighted in Morgenthau’s critique of social 
science, theories today are ideological camps that bestow on morality an ideological 
function that justifies their powers-that-be that serve particular means/ends hierarchies. 
This leads to the proliferation of empirical causal analyses that cannot be debated, 
since they rely on political interests that theory ideologically justifies and offers internal 
validation. To avoid this problem, the paper answers the second question by proposing 
to demarcate the discipline through Morgenthau’s concept of ‘interest defined as 
power’. It argues that demarcating the discipline on the basis of this concept opens 
room for engaging in dialogue in IR through leaving open the normative debate of means 
and ends, and thus acts as a bulwark against the proliferation of ideological camps, while 
promoting theoretical pluralism.
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Introduction
There is no one agreed definition of pluralism in International Relations (IR). Pluralism 
in IR may mean to ‘deprive any particular methodology of the ability to claim a uniquely 
scientific status’ (Jackson, 2011: 189 emphasis in original). It may mean promoting a 
project of a ‘Global IR’ that is no more dominated by one region or set of (state-based) 
actors (Acharya, 2014). It may mean ‘expanding the methodological toolkit’ a la analytic 
eclecticism (Sil and Katzenstein, 2008), questioning the dominance of neo-positivist 
methodology and its delegitimation of other approaches to knowledge production 
(Tickner, 2016), or, alternatively, a more open ‘critical problem solving’ approach 
(Brown, 2013). It may mean rejecting the ‘evil’ of isms, and in lieu focusing on ‘mid-
range’ theorising (Bennet, 2013; Lake, 2011), or, by contrast, theoretical exchange 
(Mearsheimer and Walt, 2013). Pluralism may mean avoiding the reproduction of IR as 
a colonial discipline that neglects important events in world history, such as the Haitian 
revolution (Grovogui, 2006), or tell the ‘real story of Europe’ altogether (Jones, 2006: 7). 
This is by no means an exhaustive list of what pluralism may mean, but enough to show 
that if ‘isms’ are authoritarian, divisive, evil, then the state of plural-ism reproduces these 
‘camps’ further, with each camp ‘relatively secure today, comfortable in the knowledge 
that it has a power based in the field’ (Sylvester, 2013: 615).
The debate on pluralism in IR is inseparable from the question of what IR, as a disci-
pline, entails and how it is demarcated as a discipline. The question ‘what is IR’ was thus 
recently debated in the journal International Relations, following Rosenberg’s (2016) 
seminal paper that called for breaking the discipline out of the ‘prison’ of political science, 
and accounting for the independence of the ‘international’ and its implications for societal 
multiplicity. Rosenberg’s critics immediately posited his failure to account for the prison 
of ‘colonial modernity’ in erasing multiplicity from IR (Blaney and Tickner, 2017a) and 
for failing to present a restrictive ‘multiplicity’ that is inclusive enough to ‘encompass all 
the work that presently goes on in international studies’ (Jackson, 2017: 83). Later critics 
raised similar concerns about Rosenberg’s ‘oddly Westphalian’ conception of IR (Sears, 
2018: 243), and suggested thinking about the multiplicity of ‘social, natural and techno-
logical spheres’ (Corry, 2018: 244), ‘think[ing] of multiplicity and its consequences far 
beyond humanity’ (Peltonen, 2018: 245), and ‘deepening multiplicity’ (Powel, 2018). 
What is evident here once again is the value of pluralism despite the lack of consensus on 
what it means, and consequently, what IR, as a discipline, may entail (Lake, 2016: 1119).
This background raises two questions that this paper engages with. First, why did IR 
pluralism end with so many incommensurable camps? Second, (how) can IR be demar-
cated as a discipline where these camps can find common ground for dialogue without 
glossing over theoretical pluralism? To answer the first question, this paper argues that 
Morgenthau’s critique of IR as social science can explain the proliferation of camps in IR 
pluralism that are incommensurable and cannot engage in dialogue. A key problem with 
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the IR pluralism debate is that political interests are used as entry points to theory but 
then legitimised through empirical validation and closed to normative scrutiny. In his 
critique of IR as social science, Morgenthau warned against this problem because it 
glosses over the dilemma of politics. This dilemma consists of the fact that, to paraphrase 
Cox (1981), in theory someone will always be a means and someone will always be an 
end. By glossing over this dilemma, theory bestows on morality the ideological function 
of justifying the power-that-be of a particular means/ends hierarchy.1 This blurs the dis-
tinction between theory and ideology, on the one hand, and leads to the proliferation of 
empirical knowledge, which, having liberated itself from the dilemma of politics, in turn 
leads to the proliferation of ideologies that defend the status quo of particular powers-
that-be, on the other. This explains why ‘we have so many ideologies’ that are incom-
mensurable, ‘and so few theories’ in IR pluralism today (Morgenthau, 1959: 28). To 
avoid this problem, Morgenthau presented the concept of ‘interest defined as power’. As 
a ‘theory’ of international politics, this concept puts intellectual order on IR as a disci-
pline (Guilhot, 2011; Guzzini, 1998). An order that does not necessarily abolish plural-
ism, since there are various normative objectives that lead to the proliferation of 
theoretical approaches in IR, but that situates these theories in the broader theoretical 
framework of interest defined as power and in turn seeks to adjust those interests qua 
normative prioritisations of means and ends. Drawing on Morgenthau to answer the sec-
ond question on demarcating the discipline and engaging in dialogue, this paper thus 
argues that Morgenthau’s concept of interest defined as power is a useful analytical tool 
here. Specifically, it argues that demarcating the discipline on the basis of this concept 
opens room for engaging in dialogue in IR through leaving open the normative debate of 
means and ends, and thus acts as a bulwark against the proliferation of ideological camps, 
while promoting theoretical pluralism.
This paper is thus situated in the context of the pluralism debate in IR. More pre-
cisely, the paper is situated at the intersection between two sub-debates within pluralism 
in IR: first, the debate on fragmentation and end of IR, on which there was a recent 
special issue in the European Journal of International Relations (2013) and forum in 
International Relations (2017), and second in the debate on ‘dialogue’ in IR, on which 
special issues and forums were covered in Millennium (2011) and International Studies 
Review (2003). Drawing on Morgenthau, the theoretical contribution here is twofold: 
first, the paper illustrates the relevance of Morgenthau’s critique of social science to the 
contemporary debate on pluralism in IR, particularly in explaining the issue of incom-
mensurability. Second, the paper employs Morgenthau’s concept of interest defined as 
power in a novel fashion to foster dialogue in a theoretically pluralist discipline. While 
the normative dimension in Morgenthau, particularly his critique of social science, was 
highlighted by intellectual historians (Frei, 2000; Guilhot, 2011; Petersen, 1999), and in 
various contexts (Karkour, 2018; Molloy, 2009; Roesch, 2014). And while the conse-
quence of this critique was put forward to re-interpret the disciplinary history of IR 
(Williams, 2013), destabilise divisions between theoretical approaches (Behr and 
Roesch, 2012; Behr and Williams, 2017) and provide ‘alternative theorising’ to the 
meta-theoretical impasse in a fragmented discipline (Paipais, 2014: 355–356), this 
paper’s unique contribution lies in drawing on Morgenthau’s critique of social science 
to explain why theories become incommensurable ideologies, and, building on this, in 
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offering a way forward for IR to be demarcated as a theoretically pluralist discipline 
where theories can find common ground for dialogue.
The argument develops as follows: first, the paper contextualises the problem of 
forgetting political interests in IR pluralism – that is, the problem of political interests 
being used as entry points to theory but then legitimised through empirical validation 
and closed to normative scrutiny. Second, the paper highlights Morgenthau’s warning 
against this problem – that it omits the dilemma of politics – in his critique of IR as a 
social science. Third, the paper draws on this critique to explain the issues of incom-
mensurability and dialogue in IR pluralism. Following this, the paper concludes by 
drawing the implications for dialogue in IR.
IR pluralism and the problem of forgetting
This section argues that the IR pluralism debate forgets the political interests upon which 
the various positions stand, and thus, forfeits the adjustment of the interests these stances 
represent. Political interests are used as entry points to theory but then legitimised 
through empirical validation and closed to normative scrutiny.
To avoid reducing legitimate knowledge production in IR to one methodology, Jackson 
(2011, 2017) proposes a pluralism in what constitutes as science. As Tickner argues, how-
ever, ‘even if, following Jackson, one were to embrace a pluralist, post-foundational defini-
tion of ‘science,’ the core–periphery structure that is entrenched in Global IR (and, indeed, 
nearly all social science) would remain basically untouched’ (2013: 642). This critique 
echoes earlier reviews of Jackson’s Conduct of Inquiry that problematised not only 
Jackson’s typology of methodological pluralism (Humphreys, 2013; Wight, 2013), and 
omission of ‘other-worldliness’ (Acharya, 2011), but also his underplaying of the political 
interests that divide these ‘methodologies’, in favour of a liberal ethos of tolerance 
(Suganami, 2013). In other words, what distinguishes methodologies is neither logic nor 
reason, but political interests that Jackson simply forgot. These interests are then reduced 
to different methodologies that retain their scholarly legitimacy through their internal, 
empirical validation, obscuring thus the normative basis of ‘science’ (Reus-Smit, 2013).
The problem of forgetting is not specific to Jackson’s Conduct of Inquiry. In fact, 
latest trends in the IR pluralism debate, such as Global IR and post-colonial IR, equally 
suffer from the problem of forgetting. Calls for pluralism as part of Global IR aim for a 
diverse and inclusive IR that gives voice to ‘non-Western’ actors (Acharya et al., 2019; 
Acharya and Buzan, 2019; Gelardi, 2019). ‘Marked by a simultaneous increase in 
global and international connections and exchanges’ Katzenstein (2016: 153) argues, 
‘the dialogue of Global IR will serve the purpose of articulating and reinforcing rich 
diversities’. ‘The idea of Global IR’, says Acharya, ‘serves as a framework for advanc-
ing IR toward a truly inclusive and universal discipline’ (Acharya, 2016: 5). ‘A chal-
lenge for Global IR’, therefore, is ‘how to build generalisable concepts and theories 
from a national or regional context that should not only be applicable to a specific 
country or region but must have broader generalisation potential’ (Acharya, 2016: 6). 
But then here one may ask: who do these ‘national’ schools represent? In his critique of 
Acharya, Parmar (2019: 238) for example problematises the Global IR project where 
‘the true contributions of the West and non-West are recognised, synthesised, and 
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celebrated . . . and yet one in which serious problems of class inequality persist’. In 
forgetting class interests, Parmar’s critique highlights the particular, elitist, interests the 
various ‘national schools’ in Global IR represent.
A corollary to Parmar’s critique here is the question whether ‘national’ experiences in 
Global IR can be essentialised. Bilgin (2008: 6), for example, argues that ‘Western’ and 
‘non-Western’ experiences as well as their various interpretations have, over the years, 
clashed and fused in so many ways that ‘non-Western’ ways of thinking about and doing 
world politics are not always devoid of ‘Western’ concepts and theories’. The central 
issue, however, which Bilgin does not address, is do these ‘fused’ and complex ‘West’ 
and ‘non-West’ even have agreed representatives? In the absence of a consensus of rep-
resentatives of civilisations, a dialogue of civilisations ends up silencing voices. ‘For 
example’ Petito says,
the already-mentioned initiatives of Mediterranean regionalisation involving European and 
Arab countries are to be encouraged as a way of fostering bridges of communication and mutual 
understanding between the European Union and the Arab League; they can also constitute 
laboratories for the praxis of inter-civilisational dialogue. (2016: 87)
But the Arab League does not represent ‘Arab culture’, only state representatives, 
largely, if not all, autocrats who suppress their people. Where is the ‘civilisational dia-
logue’ here? The problem with the dialogue Petito advocates is that ‘traditions’ that 
underlie ‘non-Western’ theories are in effect the result of political interests in more than 
one sense: as representatives with political interests but also as representatives compet-
ing to legitimise these interests among others within each tradition. The result is that any 
such ‘non-Western’ theory would prioritise those who speak in the name of tradition, or 
the ‘local’ (Gelardi, 2019), and giving the back seat to those who hold no such privilege. 
The ‘representatives’ of national schools, ‘traditions’, ‘perspectives’, thus risk becoming 
the shadows of neorealist and neoliberal schools in the previous US experience: silenc-
ing voices, restricting IR, representing exclusionary and unadjusted political interests, 
escaping ‘Eurocentrism’ to introduce ‘Globacentrism’. This ‘Globacentrism’ is charac-
terised by its forgetfulness of the political interests upon which the proliferated ‘repre-
sentatives’, ‘traditions’, ‘perspectives’ stand, and thus, the forfeit of the adjustment of the 
interests these stances represent. Thus, the political interests of the representatives of 
‘non-Western traditions’ or the ‘local’, once used as an entry point to theory, are closed 
to normative scrutiny. Rather, they are pushed under theory, depoliticised, legitimised 
through empirical validation and immune from normative critique.
Post-colonial scholars define pluralism in terms of ‘decolonising’ IR. Decolonising 
IR is not just about ‘adding voices’, says Capan, 
‘it is not only through “adding” more critical perspectives that coloniality can be challenged but 
through altering the practices of said knowledge production’ (Capan, 2017: 6). Thus ‘the 
intellectuals must firstly “decolonise their minds” and rethink the academic spaces and 
knowledges that they inhabit and reproduce . . . it is not enough to bring in new narratives or 
ways of conceptualising the field, but rather the binaries and dualities upon which coloniality 
is premised need to be overcome’ (Capan, 2017: 7–8; see also Blaney and Tickner, 2017b; 
Fonseca, 2019; Holden, 2014; Sabaratnam, 2011; Zondi, 2018).
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Here the key contribution consists of problematising the knowledge / power relation-
ship in Western IR and post-Western IR. Thus ‘decolonising IR’ means exploring ‘world-
ing beyond the West’ (Holding, 2014), seeking ‘alternative cosmologies’ (Blaney and 
Tickner, 2017b), and going beyond ‘epistemic imperialism’ (Zondi, 2018). Yet, once 
again, post-colonialism essentialises the non-West. ‘The radical cultural relativism that 
such views promote as the cornerstone of pluralism and openness’ as Rosa Vasilaki 
forcefully argues,
is perhaps the strongest version of essentialism – the one that reaffirms stereotypes like the 
West as change and the Rest as stasis, Europe as modernity and the ‘global South’ as tradition, 
the Westerner as secular and the ‘Other’ as religious and so on – and ultimately shares the 
fundamentalist view that when cultures mix, a violent act against their essence is taking place. 
(2012: 20)
Consequently, there is not only an unproblematised acceptance of this newly estab-
lished binary, but of turning it into a political project whose interests are simply forgotten 
and hardly open to normative scrutiny. As with the Global IR project, therefore, the 
political interests of the representatives of the ‘rest’, ‘global South’, ‘other’, once used as 
an entry point to theory, are closed to normative scrutiny. Rather, normative questions are 
reduced to the closure of the empirical justification that theory provides within itself, 
relying on the grounds of the ‘culture’, ‘tradition’, etc. – whatever the theorist herself 
finds as a legitimating tool.
In sum, latest trends on pluralism in IR suffer from the problem of forgetting, that is, 
they represent political interests but then forget these interests and forfeit their adjust-
ment. Consequently, political interests, once used as an entry point to theory, are closed 
to normative scrutiny. Morgenthau warned against this problem in his critique of IR as 
social science because it glosses over the dilemma of politics central to IR and sought to 
restate the political as the adjustment of interests through his concept of ‘interest defined 
as power’. It is therefore to this critique that the next section turns.
Morgenthau’s critique of IR as a social science
Why is Morgenthau the suitable candidate for our analysis here? First, because he was the 
major opponent of IR as a social science in the history of the discipline (Guilhot, 2011; 
Williams, 2013). Despite Morgenthau’s opposition to IR as a social science, his work has 
not only been misappropriated as positivist or summarised under realism, but also targeted 
by post-colonial critics (e.g. Hobson, 2012; see also Berenskötter, 2018: 815) for a 
Eurocentrism that Global IR is seeking to move beyond. Indeed, is not the problem that 
IR is a ‘colonial discipline’ with ‘colonial origins’ where Morgenthau belongs? (Capan, 
2017). Morgenthau’s work however does not fit into the definition(s) of ‘Eurocentrism’ in 
the discipline i.e. ‘a hegemonic representation and mode of knowing that claims univer-
sality for itself’ (Escobar, 2004: 217). To Morgenthau, there is no such thing as universal-
ity or universal history to begin with. There are rather limits to modernity, and therefore 
limits of ‘modernity/coloniality’ as knowledge (Capan, 2017). If the critique of 
Eurocentrism is also a critique of modernity, rationalism and positivism associated with 
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American IR, to associate this IR with Morgenthau is a mistake. For Morgenthau’s career, 
from Scientific Man (1946) onwards, consists of a critique of positivism, modernity and 
rationalism. It is precisely because little has been covered on this critique by Morgenthau 
until the end of the Cold War, that a largely caricatured understanding of his realism devel-
oped as a part of a ‘Western’ or ‘American’ IR (Behr and Heath, 2009), despite the fact 
that Morgenthau’s intellectual influences were largely German speaking, for example 
Freud (Schuett, 2010), Nietzsche (Frei, 2000) and Weber (Turner and Mazur, 2009). As 
Hamati-Ataya (2010: 1087 emphasis in original) in an earlier work on Morgenthau argues, 
‘Morgenthau’s approach is successful in identifying Realism’s reflexive challenge – 
because it acknowledges its political nature and its relevance to scholarship’.
The second reason Morgenthau is a suitable candidate is because he does not only 
share a post-Nietzschean, epistemological starting point with post-colonialism, but also 
goes beyond the latter in refusing to close normative scrutiny within the political. If 
decolonisation, going beyond ‘Eurocentrism’, is about decolonising the mind from 
binary thinking and identity formation (Capan, 2017), Morgenthau is an appropriate can-
didate to provide this critique, for he similarly critiqued Schmitt for the friend/enemy 
binary (Roesch, 2014) as well as the Cartesian dualities (Behr, 2013). Thus, post-coloni-
alism and Morgenthau’s classical realism share the same epistemological starting point: 
post-Nietzschean perspectivism (Vasilaki, 2012: 5). Indeed, post-colonialism, in its most 
radical post-structuralist critique of knowledge/power returns to the basic questions 
Morgenthau was grappling with in the post-Nietzschean age: ‘where to go after the pro-
vincialisation of Europe, after the realisation that power and knowledge are mutually 
constitutive and after ‘objectivity’ has been proven both false and undesirable’ (Vasilaki, 
2012: 20). In both cases, there is an acknowledgement of the limits of universalisation of 
theory, yet in Morgenthau there is also a refusal to close normative scrutiny within the 
political (Paipais, 2014).
What is, then, Morgenthau’s critique of IR as a social science?
Morgenthau and the critique of IR as a social science
Morgenthau’s critique of IR as a social science is two-fold. First, it is a critique of theory 
transcending the dilemma of politics and becoming ideology. Second, it is a critique of 
the proliferation of empirical knowledge, which, having liberated itself from the dilemma 
of politics, in turn leads to the proliferation of ideologies that defend the status quo of 
particular powers-that-be. In an important, albeit neglected, passage Morgenthau defines 
the dilemma of politics as follows:
. . . the totality of human actions presents itself as a hierarchy of actions each of which is the 
end of the preceding and a means for the following. This hierarchy culminates in the ultimate 
goal of all human activity which is identical with the absolute good, be it God, humanity, the 
state, or the individual himself. This is the only end that is nothing but end and hence does not 
serve as a means to a further end . . . In the last analysis, then, the doctrine that the ethical end 
justifies unethical means, leads to the negation of absolute ethical judgments altogether. For if 
the ethical end justifies unethical means, the ultimate and absolute good which all human 
activity serves as means to an end justifies all human actions. (Morgenthau, 1945: 9)
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The dilemma here lies in the choice of political end, which by necessity leads to the exclu-
sion of all other ends and reduces them to ‘means’. Due to this process of exclusion, neces-
sary choice leads to the impossibility of ‘ethical judgments altogether’. This, according to 
Morgenthau, leads to a basic contradiction between morality and power in matters politi-
cal. But the mere presence of this contradiction does not mean that political actors surren-
der to the impossibility of ethical action. Rather, ‘the contradiction between the political act 
and morality and the logic of the power relation itself compel the political actor to make it 
appear as though his striving for power and the exercise of it, far from violating morality, 
were actually its consummation’ (Morgenthau, 1962a: 13). In other words, the political 
actor engages in a process of self-deception where they portray to themselves that an act of 
power is in fact an act of morality. Following this, Morgenthau argues, ‘the political actor 
now can proceed with a good conscience, being assured of his moral superiority and the 
moral inferiority of the object of his power’ (Morgenthau, 1962a: 13).
The function of morality in this context is ideological: it conceals power from itself 
and the actor. In turn, it conceals that the truth about social science is the truth about the 
dilemma of means and ends. ‘That concealment, that elaborate and subtle and purposeful 
misunderstanding of the nature of political man and of political society, is one of the 
cornerstones upon which all societies are founded’ (Morgenthau, 1958: 28). But while 
society confuses power for morality, and thus employs morality to play an ideological 
function, the role of a theory of international politics is to reveal this ‘ideological veil’, 
that is, remind power that it is power, and not morality. It must remind power that it 
appears ‘as something other than what it actually is’ and that ‘deception — deception of 
others and of self — is inseparable from the exercise of power’ (Morgenthau, 1970: 14). 
In other words, the role of theory here is to tell society that its morality provides an ideo-
logical cover for power, that is to say, that it confuses power for morality. The theorist in 
this endeavour faces two limitations:
the limitation of origin, which determines the perspective from which he looks at society, and 
the limitation of purpose, which makes him wish to remain a member in good standing of that 
society or even to play a leading role in it. (Morgenthau, 1959: 21)
These challenges cannot be completely met, since the perspective’s origin will always 
be socially and politically situated, and the theorist depends on society for their survival 
and reputation:
It stands to reason that political science as a social institution could never hope even to approach 
this ideal of a completely disinterested commitment to the truth. For no social institution can 
completely transcend the limitations of its origin, nor can it endeavour to free itself completely 
from its commitment to the society of which it forms a part, without destroying itself in the 
attempt. (Morgenthau, 1959: 22)
Despite this, Morgenthau argues the task of theory is to demonstrate awareness of the 
tension between power and morality, and be morally committed to the quest to truth:
Yet while political science as a social institution cannot hope even to approach the ideal, it must 
be aware of its existence; and the awareness of its moral commitment to the truth must mitigate 
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the limitations of origin as well as the compromises between the moral commitment and social 
convenience and ambition, both of which no political scientist can fully escape. (Morgenthau, 
1959: 23)
Political realism, therefore, as Morgenthau argues in his ‘fourth principle’ in Politics 
Among Nations,
is unwilling to gloss over and obliterate that tension [between morality and power] and thus to 
obfuscate both the moral and the political issue by making it appear as though the stark facts of 
politics were morally more satisfying than they actually are, and the moral law less exacting 
than it actually is (Morgenthau, 1978: 10)
The key in the quest for truth in matters political is to reveal (and restrain) the ideo-
logical function of morality vis-à-vis power (Morgenthau, 1959: 27). This quest is espe-
cially pressing and challenging in international politics since, ‘the main function which 
morality performs today for international politics is ideological. It makes it appear as 
though the interests and policies of individual nations were the manifestations of univer-
sal moral principles’ (Morgenthau, 1959: 28). That is to say, morality does not limit 
power, but justifies it. This blurs the distinction between morality and ideology and ide-
ology and theory: ‘The distinction between ideology and morality becomes blurred, and 
so becomes the distinction between ideology and theory’ (Morgenthau, 1959: 28).
To maintain the distance between ideology and theory – that is, to render theory 
immune from the ideological function of morality, Morgenthau proposes his concept of 
‘interest defined as power’ in a normative sense. Thus,
by making power its central concept, a theory of politics does not presume that none but power 
relations control political action. What it must presume is the need for a central concept which 
allows the observer to distinguish the field of politics from other social spheres, to orient 
himself [and / or herself] in the maze of empirical phenomena which make up that field, and to 
establish a measure of rational order within it. (Morgenthau, 1958: 39)
Theory ‘presents a map of the political scene’ and it is ‘not limited to rational explana-
tion’ (Morgenthau, 1958: 40). Rather, ‘a theory of politics also contains a normative 
element’ (Morgenthau, 1958: 40). This normative element is to bring in morality not to 
ideologically justify power, but to restrain it (Lebow, 2011: 557–558). As Alexander 
Reichwein argues therefore, to Morgenthau ‘political science in general, and any theory 
in particular was not only an instrument to explain politics, but also normative compass 
and an intellectual weapon’ (Reichwein, 2016).
It is in this context that Morgenthau employs the concept of ‘interests defined as 
power’ to demarcate IR as a discipline. He presents it as a ‘theory’ of international poli-
tics, not to present one theory among others, but to put an intellectual order on IR as a 
discipline (Guilhot, 2011; Guzzini, 1998). This theory does not necessarily abolish plu-
ralism, for there are diverse moral claims and normative objectives which lead to the 
proliferation of theoretical approaches in IR. As Morgenthau put it, ‘hypothetically one 
can imagine as many theories of international relations as there are legitimate intellectual 
perspectives from which to approach the international scene’ (Morgenthau, 1959: 16). 
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Morgenthau was also, as he wrote in his autobiography, aware of the problem of theoreti-
cal reductionism: the ‘impossibility of accounting for complexities and varieties of polit-
ical experience with the simplicities of a reductionist theory, economic [as with Marxism] 
or psychological [as with psychoanalysis]’ (Morgenthau, 1977: 14). Morgenthau’s ‘inter-
est defined as power’ instead situates IR theories in a broader framework that seeks to 
adjust those interests qua normative prioritisations of means and ends. As Williams 
(2005: 169) argues, it is ‘a rhetorical device that seeks to use the political power of this 
concept to encourage critical reflection and dialogue about interests and their relation to 
identity – to how a society sees itself and wishes to be seen by others’. Morgenthau’s 
theory, thus as Guilhot argues, ‘emerge[s] as a normative statement on what political sci-
ence should be, not as a discourse of specialisation. . .. to delineate this territory and 
make it immune to the cues of behavioralism’ (2011: 129). In other words, Morgenthau’s 
theory stands in juxtaposition to a value-free, liberal rationalist, empirically focused, 
discipline, devoid of the dilemma of politics. ‘The focus of the theory, in the last instance, 
was its repudiation of a liberalism masquerading as value-free social science and rooted 
in the tradition of Enlightenment rationalism’ (Guilhot, 2011: 132). This does not mean 
supporting value relativism, a ‘utopia power’, since Morgenthau critiques Schmitt and 
later Carr on this (Morgenthau, 1948; 1958; 1962b), but, rather, establishing the limits of 
what theory can achieve – that is to say, the limits of both social science and power 
(Behr, 2013). ‘A theory of politics, to be theoretically valid, must build into its theoretical 
structure, as it were, those very qualifications which limit its theoretical validity and 
practical usefulness’ (Morgenthau, 1959: 20). As Hom and Steele (2010: 292) argue 
therefore, ‘classical realism’s general theory of IR may be seen as a meta-argument 
against the possibility of a truly general theory’.
These limits include, especially, the policy oriented theory (e.g. see Wallace, 1996; 
Desch, 2015), of which Morgenthau was highly critical. For the closer this theory got to 
power, the less it became committed to truth, particularly in the context of Vietnam. 
‘Morgenthau’s political agenda during the Vietnam War’ as Molloy (2019: 16) lately 
argued in this journal, thus ‘fulfils this most primary goal of a reflexive approach, i.e. a 
theorist’s commitment to understanding his/her role within the context of the production 
of knowledge and the implications of that knowledge within the social and political 
realms’. Morgenthau’s role as a reflexive scholar in Vietnam was to reveal the limits of 
power to the power-that-be, the US government. Revealing the limitations of power, 
however, according to Morgenthau, should not be specific to governments only – the 
same dynamic may also apply to any, official or unofficial, male or female, top or bot-
tom, capital or labour, power. In exposing the limits of power, Morgenthau calls for 
exposing the limits of any power, of any social science, that purports to speak on behalf 
of any group. As Cozette (2008: 10) argues, ‘by permanently reminding Power that it lies 
when it pretends to embody Truth or Justice, a realist theory is in essence a critical 
weapon turned against power’. Thus, pace Hamati-Ataya, perhaps the most outspoken 
reflexivist in IR, the ‘problem of values’ is not a problem that ‘exists as such only for 
positivism’ (Hamati-Ataya, 2011: 283; see also Sjoberg, 2015: 397). Rather, the possibil-
ity of ‘collusion with power’ (Hamati-Ataya, 2011: 279) extends beyond positivist 
research and highlights the significance of Morgenthau’s proposition that politics is 
about ‘interest defined as power’. For the literature Hamati-Ataya cites as exemplar of 
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reflexivist IR, critical theory (e.g. Linklater, 1992), constructivism (e.g. Onuf, 1989; 
Kratochwil, 2002) and the English School (e.g. Dunne, 1998) have not been particularly 
immune from losing critical edge (e.g. see Jahn’s 1998 critique of Linklater), and/or 
naturalising the political (Epstein’s, 2013 critique of Onuf and Kratochwil).
Hamati-Ataya critiques Morgenthau’s ‘philosophical’ approach that ‘fails to unify its 
axiological and objectivist claims into a uniformly rigorous discourse on world affairs’ 
(Hamati-Ataya, 2010: 1101). What is meant here by ‘rigorous discourse’? If the meaning 
here is empirically verifiable statements a la positivism, then Morgenthau rejects such 
discourse because of the complexity of social planning (Morgenthau, 1944). Moreover, it 
is in this movement to ‘rigour’ that reflexivist IR loses its reflection and becomes forgetful 
of its political origins. This is not only clear above with the literature that Hamati-Ataya 
associates reflexivism (2011: 274), but also a more general critique raised against reflex-
ivist research in IR that turns from ‘a project based on recognising one’s own limitations 
. . . into a claim to enlightenment’ (Knafo, 2016: 44). Contra this scholarship, as Molloy 
argues in response to Hamati-Ataya, Morgenthau’s realism is ‘politically reflexive regard-
ing scholarship and its relationship to power and the modes of knowledge production’ 
(2019: 15 emphasis in original). Politically reflexive in that it is reflexive with a political 
agenda: a responsibility to challenge the power-that-be through invoking a normative con-
cept of power as a bulwark against morality playing an ideological function of justifying, 
rather than exposing the limitations of, power (Behr and Roesch, 2012).
The necessity of Morgenthau’s normative meaning of power lies in the political 
dilemma underlying IR or social science more generally. When IR as social science 
glosses over this dilemma, it does not only offer one normative judgment of the means 
and ends in the hierarchy of values, but also turns theory into an ideology that switches 
the function of morality from the restraint of power to the justification of a particular 
power-that-be. This leads to the proliferation of empirical, causal knowledge, which, 
having liberated itself from the dilemma of politics, proliferates political ideologies that 
protect the status quo of particular powers-that-be. This explains why to Morgenthau a 
focus on causality or causal analysis separated from the political dilemmas in action 
gives an inadequate concept of science. Indeed, in Science: Servant or Master, 
Morgenthau associates the latter conception of science with the ancient, immanent, 
Aristotelian, concept, which he juxtaposes with the modern concept:
Aristotle was satisfied with the immanent meaning of science. Here science finds its meaning 
within itself, in the theoretical constitution of the human soul that aspires to knowledge for its 
own sake . . . Modern consciousness revolts against this indifference . . . We are no longer 
capable of that self-assurance, which appears naïve in retrospect, that salutes each new 
knowledge as a new victory carrying its justification within itself. (1972: 6–8)
Morgenthau’s critique of IR as a social science is thus that by transcending the dilemma 
of politics, it, firstly, turns theory into ideology. And secondly, it leads to the prolifera-
tion of empirical knowledge, internally validated and yet inadequate as it serves as the 
ideological justification of the status quo of particular powers-that-be. Morgenthau’s 
‘realism is therefore’, as Cozette argues, ‘best described as a permanent critique of the 
powers-that-be that constantly challenges the status quo and the ideological apparatus 
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upon which it rests’ (2008: 14). The significance of this Morgenthauian critique is that 
it helps illuminate the issues of incommensurability and dialogue in IR pluralism, to 
which the paper now turns.
Morgenthau, incommensurability and dialogue  
in IR pluralism
This section firstly argues that Morgenthau’s critique of IR as social science can explain 
why IR theories today are incommensurable and cannot engage in dialogue. By tran-
scending the dilemma of politics as highlighted by Morgenthau, theories today are ideo-
logical camps that bestow on morality an ideological function that justifies their 
powers-that-be that serve particular means/ends hierarchies. This leads to the prolifera-
tion of empirical causal analyses that cannot be debated, since they rely on these hierar-
chies that theory ideologically justifies and offers internal validation. Building on this, 
the section secondly argues that the central task to engage in dialogue without glossing 
over pluralism in IR is to start with the political in a Morgenthauian sense: to demarcate 
the discipline on the basis of the concept of interest defined in terms of power.
With notable exceptions (e.g. Wight, 1996), IR scholars often draw on Kuhn’s defini-
tion of incommensurability (Hollis and Smith, 1990; Lapid, 1989; Monteiro and Ruby, 
2009; Vasquez, 1997). This is problematic since the limitation in a social science does 
not only pertain to the inapplicability of the methods of natural science to social science. 
Rather, it is that many of the themes in the philosophy of science, such as Kuhn’s ‘incom-
mensurability’, change their meaning once they traverse the realm of the natural to the 
social. They add to the empirical problem the dilemma of politics. The addition of this 
dilemma in social science means that theoretical camps are chained on a springboard of 
means and ends that render theories ‘incommensurable’ in a sense that is different from 
Kuhn’s (1970) understanding of the term. For it is the political positions that these theo-
retical arguments hold that make them exclusionary of one another. This means the ques-
tion of incommensurability and its link to the fragmentation of the discipline is not 
simply one of diverse ‘perspectives’ (Wight, 1996), or ‘methodologies’ (Jackson, 2011). 
And nor does it simply lie in the ‘complexity of society’ per se (Dunne et al., 2013: 417; 
as critiqued in Jahn, 2017: 71), or a misunderstanding of epistemology (Wight, 2019). It 
is, rather, as Jahn argues, ‘the modern episteme that endows the individual elements of 
such complex systems with their own internal nature and hence leads to fragmentation’ 
(2017: 72). As with Morgenthau, however, the key here is not to surrender to a ubiquitous 
science that is merely justified through internal, empirical, validation.
The ubiquity of this science was highlighted in Kurki’s analysis of causality (2006), 
which draws on Aristotle to highlight various causalities across the positivist-post-positivist 
spectrum. But IR as a discipline cannot justify each theoretical contribution in light of its 
empirical, causal validation. It cannot accept each new voice as a ‘victory in itself’ 
(Morgenthau, 1972: 6–8). Since then, the normative underpinnings of causal decisions are 
closed to scrutiny and each victory becomes part of an ideological camp that bestows on 
morality the ideological function of justifying the power-that-be of particular means/ends 
hierarchies. By concerning itself with ‘scientific ontology’ i.e. debate over theoretical expla-
nation, rather than what explanation is (Nexon and Jackson, 2013), IR obscures the 
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normative basis of ‘science’ (Reus-Smit, 2013), which entails the prioritisation of means and 
ends Morgenthau highlighted. Consequently, each ‘victory’ becomes part of an ideological 
camp, whose imposition of particular means/ends hierarchies as an act of power cannot be 
restrained by morality, but rather bestows on morality the ideological function of justifying 
such hierarchies. In this case, empirical causal analysis does not only proliferate, but it also 
cannot be debated, since it relies on normative hierarchies that theory ideologically justifies 
and offers empirical, causal validation. This does not, per se, indicate a ‘healthy and dynamic 
discipline’ (Jahn, 2017: 72), particularly when fragmentation may mean lack of normative 
dialogue between the various ideological ‘camps’ (Sylvester, 2013).
Of course not all scholars agree that the incommensurability of isms is intrinsic to the 
subject matter of politics. Lake (2011: 471), for example, finds the evil in the ‘isms’ them-
selves, that is, the ‘pathologies’ of grand theories, that can be escaped in mid-level theoris-
ing. This view is shared by those who call for more eclectic hypothesis testing (Sil and 
Katzenstein, 2008), more focus on concrete political problems (Kurki, 2011) and ‘causal 
mechanisms’ more generally (Bennett, 2013: 465). But these calls, as Jahn noted, ‘rest on 
meta-theoretical commitments and methodological practices from which [they] receive 
[their] scientific status and validation’ (Jahn, 2017: 69; see also Reus-Smit, 2013: 589; and 
Nau’s, 2011 critique of Lake, 2011). For example, the focus on causality and ‘causal mech-
anisms’ in eclectic and mid-range theory has been associated by some with scientific real-
ism (Bennett, 2013), by others with neo-positivism (Jackson and Nexon, 2013). Once this 
commitment is taken as a given, there is a shift from theory to methods. One issue with 
such shift, as Mearsheimer and Walt (2013: 439) argued, is that different (meta)-theoretical 
perspectives might lead to different empirical conclusions. These conclusions are not sim-
ply based on different interpretations of causality, but are representative of political inter-
ests that are in turn linked to the meta-theoretical commitments (Suganami, 2013), which 
mid-range theory and analytical eclecticism take as a given. These political interests bestow 
on morality the ideological function of legitimising the normative hierarchies of the par-
ticular powers-that-be that mid-range theory and analytical eclecticism serve. This can be 
contrasted with ‘grand theories’, which as Felix Berenskötter argues, possess an ‘ability to 
ground their ontologies, explanations and prescriptions in answers to philosophical ques-
tions of what drives ‘us’, where and who ‘we’ are, and should be, in space and time. As the 
answers can only ever be particular, they are also political’ (Berenskötter, 2018: 833). Thus 
Berenskötter suggests ‘deep theorising’ as ‘also a form of political theorising’ (Berenskötter, 
2018: 833). In this context, ‘causality’ cannot present the normative evaluation required of 
these ‘deep theories’, since causality itself is built on the choice of normative means and 
ends central to the political. The key task to engage in dialogue without glossing over plu-
ralism in this context becomes to start with the political in a Morgenthauian sense: to 
demarcate the discipline on the basis of the concept of interest defined in terms of power 
and begin with a normative debate regarding means and ends.
Morgenthau’s political and dialogue in IR pluralism
Calls for dialogue in IR are not new (Palmer, 1980: 361), and, like pluralism, dialogue 
has more than one meaning. Previous attempts to address the question of dialogue in IR 
presented ‘via medias’ and/or ‘middle grounds’. Yet, remaining within the rationalist end 
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of the methodological spectrum, these attempts were at best contentious, at worst feeding 
into the latter’s exclusionary dominance in IR. As Steve Smith argued of mainstream 
constructivism for example:
The main debates in the discipline for the next decade will be between rationalism and 
constructivism, but this is a little misleading because it implies that constructivism is positioned 
between the two approaches: I think that some of the most cited authors are not at all positioned 
between the two, but instead are really part of rationalism. (2002: 74; on ‘mainstream’ 
constructivist literature see Wendt, 1999; Adler, 1997; Checkel, 1998)
Recent calls for dialogue in IR have thus been, rightly, suspicious of such attempts at 
‘grand theorising’. Dunne et al. (2013: 407) instead called for ‘integrative pluralism’, 
which ‘allows for more diversity than ‘unity through pluralism’ and more interaction 
than ‘dis-engaged pluralism’. ‘Integrative pluralism’, thus, ‘is not an attempt to forge 
competing knowledge claims into one overarching position that subsumes them all. It is 
not a form of theoretical synthesis, nor is it a middle ground that eclectically claims to 
take the best of various theories to forge them into a ‘grand theory of everything’ (Dunne 
et al., 2013: 416). Rather, ‘the ultimate test of integrative pluralism will be researchers 
from multiple perspectives engaging in the practice of pluralism through engagement 
with alternative positions where their concerns and research interests overlap’ (Dunne 
et al., 2013: 417). Others, such as Hutchings, call for ‘dissonance’ and ‘negotiation’ as 
key ethical concepts for dialogue in ‘pluriversality’ (Hutchings, 2019: 122). Furthermore, 
calls to transcend the essentialism of the ‘non-West’, turn to dialogue via re-defining the 
universal in terms of egalitarian principles (Vasilaki, 2012: 21), and/or heterogeneity 
(Matin, 2011: 365).
These contributions raise an important question: on what basis can scholars ‘engage’ 
in dialogue or ‘negotiate’ an ‘egalitarian’ or ‘non-hegemonic’ universality here? Here the 
normative dimension is downgraded in the literature on dialogue in IR pluralism: there 
is no mention of political interests – instead, ‘theoretical results’ that need to be explicit 
(Dunne et al., 2013: 419). The success of ‘negotiation . . . involves cultivating relational 
and creative resources for finding ways of working with others’ (Hutchings, 2019: 122). 
Transcending the essentialising of the ‘non-West’ means drawing on theoretical schemes, 
such as ‘uneven and combined development’ (e.g. as in Matin, 2011; later Rosenberg, 
2016). But if theories are ideological camps, as highlighted with Morgenthau above, then 
making theoretical results explicit or being open to negotiation is not sufficient to engage 
in dialogue as part of a pluralist discipline. This is because theories remain internally 
validated, and given the omission of the dilemma of politics, they do not challenge but 
justify their powers-that-be that serve particular means/ends hierarchies. Therefore, as 
Jackson (2017) argued, theoretical schemes such as ‘uneven and combined development’ 
take IR ‘out of one [ideological] prison, into another’.
Given this background, one cannot, like Jackson (2011), simply jump into ‘dialogue’ 
with a liberal ethos and expect it to perform the political task of accommodation. Pace 
Habermas, power cannot be substituted for the rationality of the ‘better argument’ 
(Mouffe, 1999: 749–750). And nor can dialogue mean ‘reciprocal exchange for mutual 
learning’ (Eun, 2018: 440), without first accounting how such learning can take place 
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when the hierarchies of means and ends contradict, and mutually exclude, one another. 
For dialogue is an imprecise term, not only in the sense of what kind of dialogue are we 
having and the boundaries/rules of dialogue (Hutchings, 2011), but also what structural 
and ideological conditions are necessary as perquisite for dialogue. If dialogue is to 
retain its meaning in the Greek term dia-logos, which ‘is best understood as an effort by 
two or more people to make something new together’ (cited in Lapid, 2003: 130), there-
fore, the central task to avoid the ‘evil of isms’ is to start with the political in a 
Morgenthauian sense: to begin with a normative debate regarding means and ends, and 
thus, to ‘raise the question of the meaning of knowledge itself and to answer it by search-
ing not for knowledge of any kind, but for the knowledge that is worth knowing’ 
(Morgenthau, 1972: 11).
Critics may object here: ‘and who will decide’ what ‘knowledge’ is ‘worth knowing’? 
Should we not, given we have no answer to this question, then agree to keep ‘IR’ as 
broad/pluralist as possible? (e.g. see Jackson, 2017; Tickner, 2011; Dunne et al., 2013; 
Acharya, 2014). The problem with such objections is that despite their call for pluralism, 
they set their – often-liberal – normative boundaries to the science debate and do not 
open these boundaries to debate (Wolff and Zimmerman, 2016; Suganami, 2013). In 
other words, they themselves settle the normative debate before the discussion starts and 
thus close the discussion of normative justifications. An alternative approach here is for 
theory to be reflexive about the trade-offs involved in theory building – of the theory’s 
means and ends. And secondly, for theory to be open to engage in a dialogue over these 
trade-offs. This way, theory can not only be reflexive and open to dialogue, but also pur-
sue a normative concept of power a la Morgenthau, as opposed to an empirical concept 
of power a la Schmitt (Behr and Roesch, 2012). The benefit of this concept is that it 
opens room for engaging in dialogue in IR through leaving open the normative debate of 
means and ends, and thus acts as a bulwark against the proliferation of ideological camps, 
while promoting theoretical pluralism. The concluding section of the paper illustrates 
this benefit, by drawing the implications of the Morgenthau’s critique of social science 
for dialogue in the context of the IR pluralism debate.
Conclusion: ‘interest defined as power’ for dialogue in IR 
pluralism
Morgenthau’s scepticism about social science as the instrument of power-that-be has 
waned over the decades. As Michael Williams argued in his contribution to the 2013 
special issue on the ‘end of IR’ in this journal:
IR lost its previous skepticism toward social ‘science’ and became in many ways a standard-
bearer for precisely the kinds of political knowledge that [classical realists] had been at pains 
to reject and which they sought to construct the field of IR in opposition toward. Indeed, if one 
wished to be particularly provocative, it is possible to say that from this perspective, what is 
often taken as the defining moment in the invention of IR theory — the publication of Kenneth 
Waltz’s Theory of International Politics — actually marked the culmination of a move away 
from the field’s beginnings and represents the ‘end’ of IR theory as conceived by [classical 
realists]. (Williams, 2013: 657)
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Building on this, this paper drew on Morgenthau’s critique of IR as a social science to 
argue that it can explain the proliferation of camps in IR that are incommensurable and 
cannot engage in dialogue. By transcending the dilemma of politics as highlighted by 
Morgenthau, theories today are ideological camps that bestow on morality an ideologi-
cal function that justifies their powers-that-be that serve particular means/ends hierar-
chies. This leads to the proliferation of empirical causal analyses that cannot be 
debated, since they rely on political interests that theory ideologically justifies and 
offers internal validation. To avoid this problem, the paper proposed demarcating the 
discipline through Morgenthau’s concept of ‘interest defined as power’. This concept, 
the paper argued, opens room for engaging in dialogue in IR through leaving open the 
normative debate of means and ends, and thus acts as a bulwark against the prolifera-
tion of ideological camps, without glossing over theoretical pluralism. This raises the 
question: how can theory pursue a normative concept of power a la Morgenthau – a 
concept of power whose purpose is not to impose, but to mutually adjust the various 
interests in the political? To illustrate the benefit of this concept, the concluding sec-
tion of the paper depicts its implications for dialogue by drawing on two examples 
from the IR pluralism literature cited at the outset.
The first example is Jackson’s Conduct of Inquiry. In his reply to Jackson’s Conduct 
of Inquiry, Suganami argues that the choice of different methodologies depends on the 
type of questions the researcher asks (2013: 268). Furthermore, Suganami argues that 
this choice is determined by ‘politics’. This politics determines whether the researcher 
seeks (neo)positivist or analytical approaches to control the status quo, or, alternatively, 
to transform the status quo to a more emancipatory order with critical realism and reflex-
ivism (Suganami, 2013: 268). The lesson this paper draws from Morgenthau here is that 
whatever the choice is, the intrusion of politics Suganami highlights means that the theo-
rist has a responsibility to acknowledge the limitations of the power-that-be of both the 
status quo and the emancipatory order by allowing normative scrutiny to the ends and 
means of theory. For example, if the theorist seeks to control and predict within the 
parameters of the status quo (as with Waltz, 1979), it is crucial in this case not to remove 
the theorist qua decision-maker and justify this status quo through the ‘rational’ impera-
tives of some ‘system level’ abstraction (Bessner and Guilhot, 2015: 87–88). For this will 
allow foreign policy elites ‘to define political rationality in their interest and to protect 
those interests as some objective raison d’état’ (Behr and Heath, 2009: 345). And this 
means, as Behr and Heath (2009: 344–345) warned, that Morgenthau’s realism will lose 
its original role as an ideology critique and (neo)-realism will end up ideologically justi-
fying the foreign policy apparatus that serves some elite-based interest. To overcome this 
issue of theory becoming the ideology of the status quo, therefore, it is crucial to identify, 
firstly, who this status quo serves as an end and who is excluded as a means, and sec-
ondly, why this ends/means hierarchy is justified. The choice of means and ends can then 
open a dialogue with other theories that seek to overthrow this status quo for an order that 
produces new hierarchies of means and ends. It is noteworthy here that IR theorists, 
particularly post-positivists, already do this in their critique of other theories (especially 
positivists). For example, contra calls for a pluralist IR with ‘policy relevance’ (e.g. see 
Desch, 2015), feminists problematise the reduction of relevance to the realm of security 
narrowly defined in terms of the foreign policy elites as an end (e.g. Sjoberg, 2015; see 
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also Voeten, 2015: 402). This critique should not only be applied to theories branded as 
‘elitist’ or ‘positivist’ but to all theories, including the various strands in feminism. Once 
all theories are open to normative scrutiny in this same manner, a normative concept of 
power can then play its function to mutually adjust the various political interests the vari-
ous hierarchies of means and ends represent, and, crucially, act as a bulwark against ideo-
logical camps without glossing over theoretical pluralism.
The second example from the literature cited at the outset of the paper is the Global 
IR project associated with Acharya and Buzan’s works (e.g. Acharya, 2014; Acharya, 
2018; Buzan, 2016). Here, calls to include Brasilian (Alejandro, 2019), Chinese (Zhang 
and Chang, 2016), Indian (Mallavarapu, 2009), Japanese (Watanabe, 2019) and Turkish 
(Çapan, 2016) schools in IR, cannot evade the question of who are the ends and means 
of these schools without being exclusionary (Parmar, 2019), and thus bestowing on 
morality what Morgenthau referred to as the ideological function of justifying power. 
Here ‘national schools of IR might [not only] become, or be seen to become, tools of 
government in the service of the national interest’, as Buzan once raised his concern 
(2016: 157), but also have no bulwark against the ideological justification of such inter-
est in case it purports to represent universal moral values. Thus, in the context of Global 
IR, Morgenthau’s ‘interest defined as power’ stands as a bulwark against the danger of 
‘national schools’ beyond the West ‘trying to replicate the Western success of universal-
ising their own history and political theory’ (Buzan, 2018: 412). The normative meaning 
the concept of power holds here means to adjust the various interests between and within 
these schools (Behr and Roesch, 2012; Roesch, 2014). It means refusing to depoliticise 
theory’s political stance, which leads to theory transcending the dilemma in politics, and 
thus turning into ideology. It means heeding to Morgenthau’s warning in Politics Among 
Nations that ‘all nations are tempted . . . to clothe their own particular aspirations and 
actions in moral purposes of the universe’ and ‘it is exactly the concept of interest defined 
in terms of power that saves us from both that moral excess and that political folly’ 
(Morgenthau, 1978: 11). This warning is especially relevant today with the rise of exces-
sive nationalism in world politics, and in particular in the East Asian context (Schweller, 
2017). Morgenthau’s lesson to the Global IR project therefore is not to attempt to univer-
salise the particular (as Acharya advocates), but to put a check on the powers-that-be that 
these schools represent by opening to normative scrutiny the means and ends of their 
ethical hierarchies within as well as between nations.
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Note
1. The notion of ‘power-that-be’ is employed in this paper in a broad sense to include any posi-
tion of power, since from a Morgenthauian perspective, all positions are interested, including 
(e.g. reflexivist) positions whose aim is to expose the interests of others.
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